In the third of his series of articles, published Wednesday, Mr. Urek made an interesting comparison between Turkey and its Arab neighbors. "“Syria and Jordan may be governed according to Shariah law,"” he argued, “"but they are much more advanced than Turkey … in regard to the rights of the members of other religions." ”In a paragraph that probably gave shivers to secularist readers, he added the following:

“In contrast to the Turkish government … in Syria, Jordan and in the parliament of the northern Iraqi government there are a number of non-Muslim ministers ... In Syria, Jordan and in northern Iraq, non-Muslims are given a place by the municipality for building a church and they are supported, to a certain extent financially, as well. After learning this in the Middle East, the ‘complo theories produced by the people who are against foreign (or rather non-Muslim) ownership of property in Turkey makes one ponder.”

Ottoman Delight

Mr. Urek was pointing to a bitter, yet much-overlooked fact. Since its beginning, the “secular” Turkish Republic has defined its non-Muslim citizens as “minorities,” and hasn't treated them equally. In the worst of times, in the heyday of World War II, an unjust “"wealth tax"” was imposed upon them. In normal times, a subtle yet rigid discrimination continued. Official documents defined non-Muslims citizens as “"foreigners",” and popular language used terms such as "“Greek"” or "“Armenian"” as insults.

Now, one thing is understandable: In the Ottoman times, your faith also defined your nation; you were one of a Muslim, a Jew, an Armenian or a Greek. Ethnicity among Muslims — such as being a Turk, a Kurd, an Arab or a Bosnian — didn't matter. And the Republic, despite its zealous commitment to secularization, decided to continue with this tradition. So, in the Lausanne Treaty of 1922, which created the foundations of the new state, all Muslims in Turkey were defined as the majority, and non-Muslims were defined as minorities. The Ottoman paradigm continued.

But things become worse for these minorities as the republic grew more and more nationalist. This is most obvious in the case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This foremost spiritual center of the world's Orthodox Christians had a seminary on the Halki Island since 1844. The Ottomans, with their multi-religious tolerance, saw no problem at all in this. But with the Private University Law of 1971, by which the Turkish state ordered that all private institutions of higher education should either became part of the state or close down, happy days ended for the Halki Seminary. It is still closed to date.

Similarly, the Ottomans had no problem with the name of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. But, as the power lust of Ankara grew, the term “"ecumenical"” became problematic. The state simply couldn't stand an institution that claims universality. So, to date, the term “ecumenical” is officially rejected by the state and abhorred by nationalists.

In other words, non-Muslims were actually better off in the Ottoman Empire than in the Turkish Republic. No wonder the Ottoman government and high up in the bureaucracy included so many non-Muslim names — something which is unthinkable in modern Turkey. (The tragedy that befell the Armenians in 1915, by the way, was not a product of the Ottoman system; it was, rather, a product of the demise of the Ottoman system.)

Better or Worse

Which brings us to the curious point that Mr. Urek noted in his piece. The Ottoman Empire, at least partly, was a state based on Shariah, i.e., Islamic law. So is Jordan. And Syria is at least less secular then Turkey, whose “laicite” will rank among the world's top five in its ferocity. So how can it be possible that non-Muslims are better off under Shariah than secular law?

The answer lies in the fact that neither Shariah nor secular law is inherently good or bad. To be sure, there are horrific examples of shariah in the world today, such as the totalitarian system of Saudi Arabia, which imposes Islam by state force and doesn't tolerate other interpretations, let alone other faiths. But the Ottoman Empire, which was based on a much less rigid version of Shariah to begin with and which had modernized it extensively in the 19th century, was quite tolerant.

On the other hand, secularism is no guarantee of freedom. Actually most non-liberal states of the modern age, including the worst tyrannies ever, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, were secular regimes. When the Nazis issued their infamous Nuremberg Laws, which established racial discrimination against Jews, they were referring not to religion but to a secular and even “"scientific"” ideology.

So, when the bureaucratic masters of Turkey proudly proclaim, “"Secularism is the very foundation of our Republic,"” they are not saying something that we should cheer for. The real question is whether the Turkish Republic will take liberal democracy as its foundation. Until today, it hasn't done so.