That crisis was sparked by the military’s indirect yet harsh involvement in the political process, in other words, Turkish politics as usual. Yet, for the first time in the country’s history, an elected government proved to have the spine to resist the military’s pressure and, after achieving an impressive election victory, preceded to do precisely what the generals had objected to: The election of a practicing Muslim, the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, as the country’s 11th President. Europe seems to have been impressed with this civilian ascendancy, which signals the rise of a mature Turkish democracy.

However, the Commission report is also peppered with criticism. It asks for more progress in virtually every area that the EU negotiations cover, from the rights of religious minorities to the impartiality of the judiciary. While it is certainly correct to point out shortcomings, the report lacks balance. Take the infamous article 301 of the penal code, which criminalizes “insulting Turkishness, the Republic and the organs and institutions of the state,” and has drawn particular ire from Brussels.

“It's simply not acceptable that writers, journalists and other citizens are persecuted in a European democracy for critically and non-violently expressing their opinions,” Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said. No doubt, Mr. Rehn is right, Article 301 has no justification. But the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his moderate Muslim AK Party has been looking for a solution to overcome this disgrace without provoking the ultra-nationalists at home. Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin just announced that the article will be soon amended along the lines of what he claims are similar clauses in Italy and Poland. In the future, Turkish prosecutors—some of whom are too vigilant—will need government approval to initiate an inquiry.

Similarly, the Commission report condemns the difficulties of “the Kurdish population to enjoy full rights and freedoms.” Improving the Kurds’ minority rights is long overdue. But it is worth reminding Brussels that radical Kurds—not the government—are responsible for the recent reform hiatus. The PKK, which had halted its armed struggle between 1999 and 2004, started to attack again at the very moment that Turkey’s Kurds were gaining new freedoms, such as Kurdish TV and radio programs, which were unthinkable only a decade ago.

This is surely no coincidence. The PKK is not interested in Kurdish minority rights within Turkish borders but clings to a fanatic ethnic nationalism. The PKK and their imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, realize that any Turkish-Kurdish rapprochement diminishes support for them—as proved by the AKP’s astonishing popularity among Kurds in July’s general elections. By stressing their common Muslim heritage and playing down ethnic differences—and by bringing many public services to the destitute Kurdish areas—the AKP won 55% of the votes in the Kurdish southeast. The Öcalan -backed “independents” could get only 24%. Hence PKK’s strategy to provoke an armed conflict that they hoped would raise nationalistic tensions on both sides.

The Erdoğan government, though, did not fall into this trap. While it must of course do everything to eliminate the terrorist threat, it was careful not to whip up emotions against the Kurdish citizens of Turkey or their relatives in North Iraq. Mr. Erdoğan is also determined to proceed with the reforms. The draft of the new constitution that the AKP has been working on—and which has been delayed because of the PKK violence—paves the way for Kurdish language classes in high schools, along with many other freedoms that will bolster civil society, limit the state’s powers and make all bureaucratic institutions, including the military, much more open to public control.

The second big problem, according to the Commission report, is the lack of “progress on normalizing bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus.” Here, too, Brussels fails to see how Ankara feels wronged by the EU. After all, while the Turkish part of the island did its best to find a permanent solution by accepting the United Nations plan for the unification of the island in 2004, the Greek Cypriots proved to be the rejectionists. In spite of that, Brussels still rewarded them with full membership, while the Turkish North was left out in the cold. No wonder that Ankara fears that if it “normalizes bilateral relations” with the Republic of Cyprus, it will lose all leverage and the Turkish side of the divided island will remain in permanent limbo. Thus waving sticks to Turkey won’t work without offering North Cyprus a few carrots that would ease its political and economic isolation, for instance a free trade agreement with the EU.

When Europeans criticize Turkey for the inefficiencies of its democracy, they should be aware of these delicate balances in this country. Some European opinion leaders say Turkey simply doesn’t belong into the EU. Particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy favor some kind of “privileged partnership” over full membership. No doubt, these Turko-sceptic leaders pay close attention to voters’ economic concerns about Turkish plumbers possibly “stealing” European jobs and cultural anxieties about increased Muslim immigration.

But anybody with even a shred of a global vision cannot neglect the tremendous opportunity that presents itself as Turkey, a predominantly Muslim county, makes its way to Europe. The impact this could have on the wider Muslim world cannot be overestimated, especially as Turkey’s EU process is spearheaded by a party of devout Muslims and, most of the time, resisted by secular nationalists. A Turkey defined by the latter would hardly inspire other Islamic countries. But the Turkey represented by President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, who are both pious Muslims, presents a synthesis of democratic capitalism and Islamic moral values. Many Arab intellectuals follow this experiment with great interest and admiration. It will naturally be a long and winding process—but it would be unwise to render it hopeless.