American journalist Stephen Schwartz suggested in 2005 that a new version of the fallacy is on the rise, which can be called Reductio ad Jihadam. This was, according to Schwartz, “an argument that forces every debate over any aspect of the 1,400 year history of the religion of Mohammed into a framework in which Islam is said to be inseparable from, exclusively defined by, and universally characterized by violence against non-Muslims.”

A similar fallacy is at work in Turkey nowadays, which one can justifiably call as Reductio ad Sharium: the reduction of any public visibility of Islam or moral conservatism, and the demand for more religious freedom for the country's practicing Muslims, as a stepping stone to “Shariah,” i.e. Islamic law.

Adultery and Alcohol

Just look at the accusations leveled at the incumbent AKP government about its alleged attempts to “bring Shariah.”

Probably the most serious one among these is the government's effort to criminalize adultery in 2004 and penalize offenders prison term of one to three years. Yes, it was a wrong move — and I criticized it then, because I think that people's sexual life is none of the state's business. But it was hardly an introduction of Shariah. (In Islamic law, the punishment for adultery is either flogging [according to the Koran], or stoning [according to the hadiths] — not a prison sentence.) Actually adultery — cheating on ones wife or husband — used to be a crime in Turkish law since eternity and it was only abolished in the 90s. AKP's suggestion was about restoring this article. Moreover, the die-hard secular CHP had initially agreed with the AKP on this, only insisting on “the equality between men and women in the punishment.” CHP changed its mind when liberal groups reacted, and its illiberal leader, Deniz Baykal, realized that he could use this as a Reductio ad Sharium argument.

Besides, AKP was accused at the time by some ultra-conservative Islamic figures that it was criminalizing Islamic polygamy: since the law did not recognize “second wives” (which are still found in some backward areas in Turkey) any man who had them could be accused by his legal wife that he was committing adultery.

That was the most serious case in AKP's alleged efforts to “bring Shariah,” which was actually nothing more than a manifestation of moral conservatism and “family-minded” public policy.

The same is true for the limitations some AKP mayors tried to place on alcohol use. In Turkey, most conservative families don't like to see a beer hall in their neighborhood, and in some areas AKP mayors tried to take bars and pubs to “non-family” areas — until they gave up in the face of social reaction. In Istanbul when the AKP mayor decided that open-air bars in residential areas should turn the music down after 1 a.m., bar owners once again started to grumble about “Shariah,” but many secular residents welcomed the decision that allowed them a good night's sleep.

Well, that's the whole “Shariah” adventure… And besides, many EU-driven liberal reforms have been made under the AKP government, which has proved to be, according to Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria, “the most open, modern and liberal political movement in Turkey's history.”

Redefining Secularism

Another “evidence” of AKP's alleged plot to bring “Shariah” is a statement by one of its top figures, Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç, on the need to “redefine secularism.” Secularism is a fundamental principle of Turkey and it is good, Arınç argued, but it should be interpreted in a way that will guarantee more religious freedom. And all hell broke loose…

Well, it is not only Arınç or other AKP people that see a need to liberalize Turkey's self-styled secularism. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its recent 2007 annual report, noted, “The Turkish government's concept of secularism is something altogether different from the American version of separation of religion and state.” The Turkish model implies “state control over religious activity expressed in the public sphere,” the Commission added, and that this creates serious problems “both for the majority Muslim community and for all of Turkey's religious minorities.”

(But I would not suggest you to quote from that report if you plan to discuss this issue with Turkey's ultra-secularists: you would be subjected to a long and angry lecture about the wicked ties between “American imperialism” and “Shariah.”)

McCarthyism, Turkish style

Another theme in the “Shariah” alarmism is a Turkish version of McCarthyism: “The Islamists are infiltrating the state,” the narrative goes, “the AKP is appointing its own men to the bureaucracy.” Well, appointing men (and rarely women) to bureaucracy is what governments do. It is probably true that the AKP has acted in a partisan way in that regard; but that's simply a bad tradition in Turkish politics. I don't remember any administration in Turkey that was not accused by its opponents for kadrolaşma, i.e. setting up its own cadre in public offices.

“But this kadrolaşma is different,” secularists would claim, “These are backward minded people.” That very argument hides in itself the presumption that the state only belongs to the “progressive” people — i.e., who don't take religion too seriously and whose family album does not include any headscarf. But a democratic state belongs to all citizens, of course, not only the ones who consider themselves more stylish.

Which brings us to the real issue at stake: What is happening in Turkey is not the advance of “Shariah,” but the reclaiming of a fair share of the public square by the country's more conservative and rural-based masses and their newly rising elite. That very public square, and its privileges, used to be dominated by the country's secular urban elite, which can't stand to see the “second class citizens” becoming their equals. Saying that openly would not look very nice, of course, so they prefer demagogueries such as Reductio ad Sharium, in which some of them seriously believe.

Aktan, Erdoğan and the Khawarij

And it is not only the rank-and-file ultra-secularists who indulge in the “reduction.” Their most sophisticated ideologues are no different.

Take Mr. Gündüz Aktan, for example. A retired ambassador and a columnist for daily Radikal, he emerged recently as the most ardent anti-AKP, anti-liberal and anti-EU pundit in the country. In a recent piece, he accused Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan for having a “Salafi/Khawarij” faith. Salafis are modern day fundamentalists who wish to “go back to the roots” of Islam, and most of them are quite radical. The Khawarij, a much more notorious movement, is an early heretical sect which used to put all Muslims who disagreed with them (whether Sunni or Shia) to the sword. Portraying Mr. Erdoğan, a traditional Sunni Muslim, as if he is like the marginal and bloodthirsty Khawarij is simply a vilification. It is like depicting President Bush as the new Torquemada, the Great Inquisitor, simply because he is a Christian believer.

But that's how Reductio ad Sharium works in Turkey nowadays. Beware of buying into it. Of course the secularist camp might have justified concerns about and objections to AKP policies; but their cries about “Shariah” are based on paranoia — and absurdum.